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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 23:52:15 +09:00

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---
id: wiki-2026-0508-tara
title: TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
category: 10_Wiki/Topics
status: verified
canonical_id: self
aliases: [Threat Analysis Risk Assessment, ISO 21434 TARA, Automotive Threat Modeling]
duplicate_of: none
source_trust_level: A
confidence_score: 0.9
verification_status: applied
tags: [security, threat-modeling, automotive, iso-21434]
raw_sources: []
last_reinforced: 2026-05-10
github_commit: pending
tech_stack:
language: methodology
framework: iso-21434
---
# TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
## 매 한 줄
> **"매 automotive cybersecurity 의 mandatory threat modeling"**. 매 ISO/SAE 21434 의 core process — 매 vehicle E/E system 의 cybersecurity risk 의 systematic 의 identify + assess + treat. 2026 의 UNECE R155 type-approval 의 prerequisite.
## 매 핵심
### 매 7 steps (ISO 21434 §15)
1. **Asset identification**: 매 cybersecurity property (CIAA) 의 정의.
2. **Threat scenario identification**: STRIDE/EVITA 의 적용.
3. **Impact rating**: Safety, Financial, Operational, Privacy (SFOP).
4. **Attack path analysis**: 매 attack tree / kill chain.
5. **Attack feasibility rating**: time, expertise, knowledge, opportunity, equipment.
6. **Risk determination**: Impact × Feasibility → 1-5 risk value.
7. **Risk treatment**: avoid, reduce, share, retain.
### 매 STRIDE for automotive
- **S**poofing — 매 ECU identity forgery (CAN ID).
- **T**ampering — 매 firmware mod, OTA hijack.
- **R**epudiation — 매 audit log absence.
- **I**nfo disclosure — 매 GPS/PII leak.
- **D**oS — 매 CAN bus flood.
- **E**oP — 매 infotainment → drive ECU pivot.
### 매 vs IT threat modeling
- **Lifecycle**: 매 15 yr vehicle 의 — 매 long-term update.
- **Safety coupling**: 매 cyber → physical harm (브레이크).
- **Supply chain**: 매 multi-tier (OEM ← T1 ← T2).
- **Standards**: 매 ISO 21434 + UNECE R155 의 mandatory.
### 매 응용
1. New vehicle development (concept phase).
2. CSMS audit evidence.
3. Post-incident re-assessment.
## 💻 패턴
### Asset table (YAML)
```yaml
assets:
- id: ASSET-01
name: Brake control message
properties: [integrity, availability]
rationale: Loss → safety-critical
- id: ASSET-02
name: GPS trajectory log
properties: [confidentiality]
rationale: PII / GDPR
- id: ASSET-03
name: ECU firmware
properties: [integrity, authenticity]
```
### Damage scenario × impact rating
```yaml
damage_scenarios:
- id: DS-01
asset: ASSET-01
description: Attacker injects fake brake-release message
impact:
safety: severe # S3 (life-threatening)
financial: moderate
operational: major
privacy: negligible
overall: severe
```
### Threat scenario (STRIDE)
```yaml
threats:
- id: TS-01
target: ASSET-01
stride: tampering
description: Spoof brake CAN frame from compromised infotainment
leads_to: DS-01
```
### Attack path
```
Internet → Telematics gateway (CVE-X) → Internal CAN gw bypass →
Body CAN → Inject 0x100 brake frame
```
### Feasibility rating (ISO 21434 Annex G)
```yaml
attack_path: AP-01
factors:
elapsed_time: 1_to_6_months # 4 pts
expertise: expert # 6 pts
knowledge: restricted # 3 pts
window: easy # 1 pts
equipment: specialized # 4 pts
total: 18 # → Medium feasibility
```
### Risk matrix
```
Feasibility →
Impact ↓ VeryLow Low Med High
Severe 2 3 4 5
Major 1 2 3 4
Moderate 1 1 2 3
Negligible 1 1 1 2
```
### Treatment plan
```yaml
risk: R-01 (severe × medium = 4)
treatment: reduce
controls:
- C-01: Message Authentication Code (MAC) on brake CAN
- C-02: Secure boot on telematics gateway
- C-03: Firewall rules between domains
residual_risk: 2 # acceptable
```
## 매 결정 기준
| 상황 | Approach |
|---|---|
| Automotive E/E (mandatory) | TARA per ISO 21434 |
| IT system | STRIDE / PASTA |
| Industrial control (ICS) | IEC 62443 ZCR |
| Generic risk | NIST 800-30 |
**기본값**: 매 ISO 21434 TARA — 매 OEM type approval (UNECE R155) 의 required.
## 🔗 Graph
- 변형: [[STRIDE]] · [[OCTAVE]]
## 🤖 LLM 활용
**언제**: threat scenario brainstorming, attack tree generation, control gap analysis.
**언제 X**: final risk decision (human cybersecurity engineer 의 sign-off).
## ❌ 안티패턴
- **One-shot TARA**: 매 lifecycle 의 update 의 — 매 vuln/incident 의 trigger.
- **Generic STRIDE only**: 매 automotive-specific 의 EVITA 의 augment.
- **Skipping feasibility**: 매 impact-only 의 risk 의 inflated.
- **Doc theater**: 매 controls 의 implement 의 X — 매 evidence 의 X.
## 🧪 검증 / 중복
- Verified (ISO/SAE 21434:2021, UNECE WP.29 R155, EVITA project).
- 신뢰도 A.
## 🕓 Changelog
| 날짜 | 변경 |
|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — ISO 21434 7-step TARA, automotive STRIDE |