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에이전트 8종(대화형/프로그래머 C·S/디자이너/설계자/기획자/QA/PD/PM)에게 [공통 기본 능력 + 롤별 Specialty] 2층으로 지식을 주입하기 위한 재분류. 문서 내용·포맷은 무수정, 폴더 이동만 (6,372개 문서 수 보존 확인). - Topic_Programming → Domain_Programming (내부 구조 보존) - Topic_Graphic → Domain_Design - Topic_Business → Domain_Product - Topic_General → Domain_General - _Common 신설: Math(구 Topic_Math_Specialty), Reasoning(구 General/From_Thinking & Reasoning), Reasoning_Creativity(구 General/From_창의성), Communication(Poetic_Blog_Writing + From_writing) - 타 도메인의 From_* 폴더는 유지 (출처 표기일 뿐, 이미 도메인에 맞게 분류된 문서) - 빈 폴더 정리 (memory/procedures) - 에이전트→폴더 매핑은 workspace의 .astra/agent-knowledge-map.json (9개 에이전트) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
5.2 KiB
5.2 KiB
id, title, category, status, canonical_id, aliases, duplicate_of, source_trust_level, confidence_score, verification_status, tags, raw_sources, last_reinforced, github_commit, tech_stack
| id | title | category | status | canonical_id | aliases | duplicate_of | source_trust_level | confidence_score | verification_status | tags | raw_sources | last_reinforced | github_commit | tech_stack | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| wiki-2026-0508-session-lifecycle | Session Lifecycle | 10_Wiki/Topics | verified | self |
|
none | A | 0.9 | applied |
|
2026-05-10 | pending |
|
Session Lifecycle
매 한 줄
"매 user 의 매 authenticated state 의 매 birth → death". Session lifecycle 는 매 login 으로 매 시작, 매 idle/absolute timeout 또는 매 explicit logout 으로 매 끝. 2026 현재 매 stateless JWT 의 매 short-lived access token (15 min) + 매 stateful refresh token (rotating, server-revocable) 의 매 hybrid 가 매 dominant; 매 OWASP ASVS V3 가 매 baseline.
매 핵심
매 Phases
- Auth: credential verify (password, MFA, passkey).
- Issue: session token (cookie / JWT) + binding (UA, IP optional).
- Validate: per-request check + refresh.
- Refresh: rotation on each use.
- Terminate: logout, idle (15-30min), absolute (12-24h), forced (admin, breach).
매 Token strategies
- Stateful (DB session): server stores; revocable instantly; scale via Redis.
- Stateless JWT: signed token; revocation via short TTL or blocklist.
- Hybrid: short JWT access + opaque refresh in DB.
매 Cookie attributes
HttpOnly— XSS protection.Secure— TLS only.SameSite=Lax(or Strict) — CSRF.__Host-prefix — domain lock.Path=/and reasonableMax-Age.
매 응용
- Web SPA + cookie session.
- Mobile app + refresh-token rotation.
- SSO (SAML/OIDC) federated.
- Service mesh (mTLS-based).
💻 패턴
Cookie session (Express + Redis)
import session from "express-session";
import RedisStore from "connect-redis";
app.use(session({
store: new RedisStore({ client: redis, prefix: "sess:" }),
secret: process.env.SESSION_SECRET!,
resave: false,
saveUninitialized: false,
cookie: {
httpOnly: true, secure: true, sameSite: "lax",
maxAge: 30 * 60_000, // idle timeout via touch
},
rolling: true,
}));
JWT access + rotating refresh
function issueTokens(userId: string) {
const access = jwt.sign({ sub: userId }, ACCESS_SECRET, { expiresIn: "15m" });
const refresh = crypto.randomUUID();
redis.set(`refresh:${refresh}`, userId, "EX", 60 * 60 * 24 * 14);
return { access, refresh };
}
async function rotate(oldRefresh: string) {
const userId = await redis.get(`refresh:${oldRefresh}`);
if (!userId) throw new Error("invalid");
await redis.del(`refresh:${oldRefresh}`); // single-use
return issueTokens(userId);
}
Idle + absolute timeout
type Session = { userId: string; createdAt: number; lastSeenAt: number };
const ABSOLUTE = 24 * 3600_000;
const IDLE = 30 * 60_000;
function valid(s: Session): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
return now - s.createdAt < ABSOLUTE && now - s.lastSeenAt < IDLE;
}
Global logout (token version)
// User table column: tokenVersion (incremented on logout-everywhere)
const access = jwt.sign({ sub: user.id, ver: user.tokenVersion }, SECRET);
// On verify
if (decoded.ver !== currentUser.tokenVersion) throw new Error("revoked");
Session hijack defense (binding)
function bindClaims(req: Request) {
return crypto.createHash("sha256")
.update(req.headers["user-agent"] + req.ip).digest("hex");
}
// On issue: store. On validate: compare. Mismatch → require re-auth.
Concurrent session limit
const sessions = await redis.smembers(`user_sessions:${userId}`);
if (sessions.length >= 5) {
const oldest = sessions[0];
await redis.del(`sess:${oldest}`);
await redis.srem(`user_sessions:${userId}`, oldest);
}
매 결정 기준
| 상황 | Approach |
|---|---|
| 매 Web SPA, 매 same domain | Cookie + CSRF token |
| 매 mobile / cross-origin | JWT access + refresh in secure storage |
| 매 high-security (banking) | Short access (5m) + step-up auth |
| 매 SSO required | OIDC + IdP-managed session |
기본값: HttpOnly Secure SameSite=Lax cookie + Redis-backed session, 30m idle / 24h absolute.
🔗 Graph
- 부모: Application Security
- 변형: JWT · OAuth 2.0
- 응용: 보안 및 시스템 신뢰성 표준 · 보안 및 시스템 신뢰성 표준
🤖 LLM 활용
언제: Session anomaly detection (매 sudden geo / device shift), suspicious-activity summary for support. 언제 X: 매 token issuance / signing — 매 deterministic crypto only.
❌ 안티패턴
- localStorage JWT: 매 XSS → 매 token theft. 매 HttpOnly cookie.
- No refresh rotation: 매 leaked refresh = 매 forever access.
- No absolute timeout: 매 1년 session — 매 dormant account hijack.
- Client-side only check: 매 every request server-side.
🧪 검증 / 중복
- Verified (OWASP Session Management Cheat Sheet, ASVS V3, NIST SP 800-63B).
- 신뢰도 A.
🕓 Changelog
| 날짜 | 변경 |
|---|---|
| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — JWT+refresh hybrid + passkey-era state |