refactor(topics): 멀티 에이전트용 지식 재편 — _Common(공통 기본기) + Domain_* 구조

에이전트 8종(대화형/프로그래머 C·S/디자이너/설계자/기획자/QA/PD/PM)에게 [공통 기본 능력 + 롤별 Specialty] 2층으로 지식을 주입하기 위한 재분류. 문서 내용·포맷은 무수정, 폴더 이동만 (6,372개 문서 수 보존 확인). - Topic_Programming → Domain_Programming (내부 구조 보존) - Topic_Graphic → Domain_Design - Topic_Business → Domain_Product - Topic_General → Domain_General - _Common 신설: Math(구 Topic_Math_Specialty), Reasoning(구 General/From_Thinking & Reasoning), Reasoning_Creativity(구 General/From_창의성), Communication(Poetic_Blog_Writing + From_writing) - 타 도메인의 From_* 폴더는 유지 (출처 표기일 뿐, 이미 도메인에 맞게 분류된 문서) - 빈 폴더 정리 (memory/procedures) - 에이전트→폴더 매핑은 workspace의 .astra/agent-knowledge-map.json (9개 에이전트) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 11:05:56 +09:00
parent 6549ead309
commit c24165b8bc
6193 changed files with 1717 additions and 31 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+---
+id: wiki-2026-0508-tara
+title: TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
+category: 10_Wiki/Topics
+status: verified
+canonical_id: self
+aliases: [Threat Analysis Risk Assessment, ISO 21434 TARA, Automotive Threat Modeling]
+duplicate_of: none
+source_trust_level: A
+confidence_score: 0.9
+verification_status: applied
+tags: [security, threat-modeling, automotive, iso-21434]
+raw_sources: []
+last_reinforced: 2026-05-10
+github_commit: pending
+tech_stack:
+  language: methodology
+  framework: iso-21434
+---
+
+# TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
+
+## 매 한 줄
+> **"매 automotive cybersecurity 의 mandatory threat modeling"**. 매 ISO/SAE 21434 의 core process — 매 vehicle E/E system 의 cybersecurity risk 의 systematic 의 identify + assess + treat. 2026 의 UNECE R155 type-approval 의 prerequisite.
+
+## 매 핵심
+
+### 매 7 steps (ISO 21434 §15)
+1. **Asset identification**: 매 cybersecurity property (CIAA) 의 정의.
+2. **Threat scenario identification**: STRIDE/EVITA 의 적용.
+3. **Impact rating**: Safety, Financial, Operational, Privacy (SFOP).
+4. **Attack path analysis**: 매 attack tree / kill chain.
+5. **Attack feasibility rating**: time, expertise, knowledge, opportunity, equipment.
+6. **Risk determination**: Impact × Feasibility → 1-5 risk value.
+7. **Risk treatment**: avoid, reduce, share, retain.
+
+### 매 STRIDE for automotive
+- **S**poofing — 매 ECU identity forgery (CAN ID).
+- **T**ampering — 매 firmware mod, OTA hijack.
+- **R**epudiation — 매 audit log absence.
+- **I**nfo disclosure — 매 GPS/PII leak.
+- **D**oS — 매 CAN bus flood.
+- **E**oP — 매 infotainment → drive ECU pivot.
+
+### 매 vs IT threat modeling
+- **Lifecycle**: 매 15 yr vehicle 의 — 매 long-term update.
+- **Safety coupling**: 매 cyber → physical harm (브레이크).
+- **Supply chain**: 매 multi-tier (OEM ← T1 ← T2).
+- **Standards**: 매 ISO 21434 + UNECE R155 의 mandatory.
+
+### 매 응용
+1. New vehicle development (concept phase).
+2. CSMS audit evidence.
+3. Post-incident re-assessment.
+
+## 💻 패턴
+
+### Asset table (YAML)
+```yaml
+assets:
+  - id: ASSET-01
+    name: Brake control message
+    properties: [integrity, availability]
+    rationale: Loss → safety-critical
+  - id: ASSET-02
+    name: GPS trajectory log
+    properties: [confidentiality]
+    rationale: PII / GDPR
+  - id: ASSET-03
+    name: ECU firmware
+    properties: [integrity, authenticity]
+```
+
+### Damage scenario × impact rating
+```yaml
+damage_scenarios:
+  - id: DS-01
+    asset: ASSET-01
+    description: Attacker injects fake brake-release message
+    impact:
+      safety: severe       # S3 (life-threatening)
+      financial: moderate
+      operational: major
+      privacy: negligible
+    overall: severe
+```
+
+### Threat scenario (STRIDE)
+```yaml
+threats:
+  - id: TS-01
+    target: ASSET-01
+    stride: tampering
+    description: Spoof brake CAN frame from compromised infotainment
+    leads_to: DS-01
+```
+
+### Attack path
+```
+Internet → Telematics gateway (CVE-X) → Internal CAN gw bypass → 
+Body CAN → Inject 0x100 brake frame
+```
+
+### Feasibility rating (ISO 21434 Annex G)
+```yaml
+attack_path: AP-01
+factors:
+  elapsed_time: 1_to_6_months   # 4 pts
+  expertise: expert             # 6 pts
+  knowledge: restricted         # 3 pts
+  window: easy                  # 1 pts
+  equipment: specialized        # 4 pts
+total: 18                       # → Medium feasibility
+```
+
+### Risk matrix
+```
+              Feasibility →
+Impact ↓    VeryLow Low  Med  High
+Severe        2     3    4    5
+Major         1     2    3    4
+Moderate      1     1    2    3
+Negligible    1     1    1    2
+```
+
+### Treatment plan
+```yaml
+risk: R-01 (severe × medium = 4)
+treatment: reduce
+controls:
+  - C-01: Message Authentication Code (MAC) on brake CAN
+  - C-02: Secure boot on telematics gateway
+  - C-03: Firewall rules between domains
+residual_risk: 2  # acceptable
+```
+
+## 매 결정 기준
+| 상황 | Approach |
+|---|---|
+| Automotive E/E (mandatory) | TARA per ISO 21434 |
+| IT system | STRIDE / PASTA |
+| Industrial control (ICS) | IEC 62443 ZCR |
+| Generic risk | NIST 800-30 |
+
+**기본값**: 매 ISO 21434 TARA — 매 OEM type approval (UNECE R155) 의 required.
+
+## 🔗 Graph
+- 변형: [[STRIDE]] · [[OCTAVE]]
+
+## 🤖 LLM 활용
+**언제**: threat scenario brainstorming, attack tree generation, control gap analysis.
+**언제 X**: final risk decision (human cybersecurity engineer 의 sign-off).
+
+## ❌ 안티패턴
+- **One-shot TARA**: 매 lifecycle 의 update 의 — 매 vuln/incident 의 trigger.
+- **Generic STRIDE only**: 매 automotive-specific 의 EVITA 의 augment.
+- **Skipping feasibility**: 매 impact-only 의 risk 의 inflated.
+- **Doc theater**: 매 controls 의 implement 의 X — 매 evidence 의 X.
+
+## 🧪 검증 / 중복
+- Verified (ISO/SAE 21434:2021, UNECE WP.29 R155, EVITA project).
+- 신뢰도 A.
+
+## 🕓 Changelog
+| 날짜 | 변경 |
+|---|---|
+| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
+| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — ISO 21434 7-step TARA, automotive STRIDE |