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Antigravity Agent
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id: wiki-2026-0508-tara
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title: TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
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category: 10_Wiki/Topics
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status: verified
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canonical_id: self
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aliases: [Threat Analysis Risk Assessment, ISO 21434 TARA, Automotive Threat Modeling]
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duplicate_of: none
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source_trust_level: A
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confidence_score: 0.9
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verification_status: applied
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tags: [security, threat-modeling, automotive, iso-21434]
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raw_sources: []
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last_reinforced: 2026-05-10
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github_commit: pending
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tech_stack:
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language: methodology
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framework: iso-21434
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---
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# TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment)
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## 매 한 줄
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> **"매 automotive cybersecurity 의 mandatory threat modeling"**. 매 ISO/SAE 21434 의 core process — 매 vehicle E/E system 의 cybersecurity risk 의 systematic 의 identify + assess + treat. 2026 의 UNECE R155 type-approval 의 prerequisite.
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## 매 핵심
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### 매 7 steps (ISO 21434 §15)
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1. **Asset identification**: 매 cybersecurity property (CIAA) 의 정의.
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2. **Threat scenario identification**: STRIDE/EVITA 의 적용.
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3. **Impact rating**: Safety, Financial, Operational, Privacy (SFOP).
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4. **Attack path analysis**: 매 attack tree / kill chain.
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5. **Attack feasibility rating**: time, expertise, knowledge, opportunity, equipment.
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6. **Risk determination**: Impact × Feasibility → 1-5 risk value.
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7. **Risk treatment**: avoid, reduce, share, retain.
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### 매 STRIDE for automotive
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- **S**poofing — 매 ECU identity forgery (CAN ID).
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- **T**ampering — 매 firmware mod, OTA hijack.
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- **R**epudiation — 매 audit log absence.
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- **I**nfo disclosure — 매 GPS/PII leak.
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- **D**oS — 매 CAN bus flood.
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- **E**oP — 매 infotainment → drive ECU pivot.
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### 매 vs IT threat modeling
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- **Lifecycle**: 매 15 yr vehicle 의 — 매 long-term update.
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- **Safety coupling**: 매 cyber → physical harm (브레이크).
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- **Supply chain**: 매 multi-tier (OEM ← T1 ← T2).
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- **Standards**: 매 ISO 21434 + UNECE R155 의 mandatory.
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### 매 응용
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1. New vehicle development (concept phase).
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2. CSMS audit evidence.
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3. Post-incident re-assessment.
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## 💻 패턴
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### Asset table (YAML)
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```yaml
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assets:
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- id: ASSET-01
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name: Brake control message
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properties: [integrity, availability]
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rationale: Loss → safety-critical
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- id: ASSET-02
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name: GPS trajectory log
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properties: [confidentiality]
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rationale: PII / GDPR
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- id: ASSET-03
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name: ECU firmware
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properties: [integrity, authenticity]
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```
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### Damage scenario × impact rating
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```yaml
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damage_scenarios:
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- id: DS-01
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asset: ASSET-01
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description: Attacker injects fake brake-release message
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impact:
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safety: severe # S3 (life-threatening)
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financial: moderate
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operational: major
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privacy: negligible
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overall: severe
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```
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### Threat scenario (STRIDE)
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```yaml
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threats:
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- id: TS-01
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target: ASSET-01
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stride: tampering
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description: Spoof brake CAN frame from compromised infotainment
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leads_to: DS-01
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```
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### Attack path
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```
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Internet → Telematics gateway (CVE-X) → Internal CAN gw bypass →
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Body CAN → Inject 0x100 brake frame
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```
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### Feasibility rating (ISO 21434 Annex G)
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```yaml
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attack_path: AP-01
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factors:
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elapsed_time: 1_to_6_months # 4 pts
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expertise: expert # 6 pts
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knowledge: restricted # 3 pts
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window: easy # 1 pts
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equipment: specialized # 4 pts
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total: 18 # → Medium feasibility
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```
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### Risk matrix
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```
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Feasibility →
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Impact ↓ VeryLow Low Med High
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Severe 2 3 4 5
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Major 1 2 3 4
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Moderate 1 1 2 3
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Negligible 1 1 1 2
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```
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### Treatment plan
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```yaml
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risk: R-01 (severe × medium = 4)
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treatment: reduce
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controls:
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- C-01: Message Authentication Code (MAC) on brake CAN
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- C-02: Secure boot on telematics gateway
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- C-03: Firewall rules between domains
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residual_risk: 2 # acceptable
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```
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## 매 결정 기준
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| 상황 | Approach |
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|---|---|
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| Automotive E/E (mandatory) | TARA per ISO 21434 |
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| IT system | STRIDE / PASTA |
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| Industrial control (ICS) | IEC 62443 ZCR |
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| Generic risk | NIST 800-30 |
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**기본값**: 매 ISO 21434 TARA — 매 OEM type approval (UNECE R155) 의 required.
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## 🔗 Graph
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- 변형: [[STRIDE]] · [[OCTAVE]]
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## 🤖 LLM 활용
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**언제**: threat scenario brainstorming, attack tree generation, control gap analysis.
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**언제 X**: final risk decision (human cybersecurity engineer 의 sign-off).
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## ❌ 안티패턴
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- **One-shot TARA**: 매 lifecycle 의 update 의 — 매 vuln/incident 의 trigger.
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- **Generic STRIDE only**: 매 automotive-specific 의 EVITA 의 augment.
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- **Skipping feasibility**: 매 impact-only 의 risk 의 inflated.
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- **Doc theater**: 매 controls 의 implement 의 X — 매 evidence 의 X.
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## 🧪 검증 / 중복
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- Verified (ISO/SAE 21434:2021, UNECE WP.29 R155, EVITA project).
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- 신뢰도 A.
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## 🕓 Changelog
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| 날짜 | 변경 |
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|---|---|
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| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
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| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — ISO 21434 7-step TARA, automotive STRIDE |
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