docs(10_Wiki): Topic_Business/General/Graphic/Programming을 Topics/ 하위로 이동
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id: wiki-2026-0508-social-engineering
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title: Social Engineering
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category: 10_Wiki/Topics
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status: verified
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canonical_id: self
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aliases: [Social Engineering Attacks, Human-Layer Attack, Phishing Family]
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duplicate_of: none
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source_trust_level: A
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confidence_score: 0.9
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verification_status: applied
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tags: [security, threat-model, phishing, awareness]
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raw_sources: []
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last_reinforced: 2026-05-10
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github_commit: pending
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tech_stack:
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language: english
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framework: security
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---
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# Social Engineering
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## 매 한 줄
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> **"매 attack 의 weakest link 의 human 의 exploit. Tech-stack 의 hardening 보다 매 human-layer 의 manipulation 가 cheaper."**. 매 phishing, vishing, pretexting, baiting 의 family — 매 2026 LLM-generated voice clones / deepfake video 가 매 attack vector 의 industrialize 했음. 매 SOC2 / ISO27001 의 awareness training 의 mandate.
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## 매 핵심
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### 매 attack vectors
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- **Phishing** (email) — bulk credential harvest.
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- **Spear-phishing** — targeted, OSINT-backed.
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- **Vishing** (voice) — 매 LLM voice clone 의 era.
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- **Smishing** (SMS) — package delivery, bank scam.
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- **Pretexting** — impersonation (CEO fraud, IT helpdesk).
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- **Baiting** — USB drop, malicious download.
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- **Tailgating** — physical access.
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### 매 psychological levers (Cialdini)
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- Authority (CEO impersonation).
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- Urgency ("account locked, act now").
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- Scarcity ("last chance").
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- Reciprocity ("free gift").
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- Social proof ("colleagues already responded").
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- Liking (rapport building).
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### 매 응용 (defense)
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1. MFA (phishing-resistant — FIDO2/passkey).
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2. SPF/DKIM/DMARC for email auth.
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3. Awareness training + simulated phishing.
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4. Approval workflow for wire transfers (out-of-band verify).
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5. Zero-trust + least-privilege blast radius limit.
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## 💻 패턴
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### DMARC enforce policy
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```dns
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_dmarc.example.com. TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@example.com; pct=100"
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```
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### Phishing simulation framework (gophish API)
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```python
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import requests
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api = "https://gophish.local/api"
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headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer TOKEN"}
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campaign = {
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"name": "Q2 Awareness",
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"template": {"name": "Fake-IT-Reset"},
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"url": "https://landing.local",
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"groups": [{"name": "All-Employees"}],
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}
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requests.post(f"{api}/campaigns/", json=campaign, headers=headers)
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```
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### FIDO2 webauthn (phishing-resistant)
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```typescript
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const credential = await navigator.credentials.create({
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publicKey: {
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challenge: serverChallenge,
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rp: { name: 'example.com' },
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user: { id, name: email, displayName: name },
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pubKeyCredParams: [{ alg: -7, type: 'public-key' }],
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authenticatorSelection: { userVerification: 'required', authenticatorAttachment: 'platform' },
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},
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});
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```
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### Wire-transfer out-of-band verify (Slack bot)
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```typescript
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bot.command('/verify-wire', async ({ command, ack }) => {
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await ack();
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const challenge = generateOTP();
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await sms.send(command.user_phone, `Wire verify code: ${challenge}`);
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await db.storeChallenge(command.user_id, challenge);
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});
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```
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### Email header anomaly detection
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```python
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def is_suspicious(msg):
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spf = msg.get('Authentication-Results', '')
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if 'spf=fail' in spf or 'dkim=fail' in spf:
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return True
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if msg['From'] != msg['Reply-To']:
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return True # display name spoof
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return False
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```
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### Deepfake voice detection (2026 ML)
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```python
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from transformers import pipeline
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detector = pipeline('audio-classification', model='WavLM-deepfake-2026')
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result = detector(audio_path)
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# returns: [{'label': 'synthetic', 'score': 0.94}, ...]
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```
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## 매 결정 기준
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| 상황 | Approach |
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|---|---|
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| Email account compromise risk | DMARC reject + FIDO2 MFA |
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| Wire transfer fraud (BEC) | Out-of-band callback verify |
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| Voice impersonation | Codeword + callback to known number |
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| USB drop | Endpoint policy block autorun |
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| Insider awareness | Quarterly simulated phishing |
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**기본값**: FIDO2 passkey + DMARC reject + quarterly training + out-of-band approval for $X+ transfers.
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## 🔗 Graph
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- 부모: [[Threat-Modeling]] · [[OWASP Top 10]]
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- 변형: [[Phishing]]
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- 응용: [[FIDO2]] · [[DMARC]] · [[Zero Trust Architecture]]
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## 🤖 LLM 활용
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**언제**: threat-model human layer, security training content, BEC playbook.
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**언제 X**: 매 actual phishing template generation — abuse risk.
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## ❌ 안티패턴
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- **SMS-only MFA**: SIM-swap vulnerable — FIDO2 prefer.
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- **Annual training only**: 매 retention low — quarterly + simulation.
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- **Trust caller-ID**: 매 trivially spoof — callback to known number.
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## 🧪 검증 / 중복
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- Verified (NIST SP 800-50, Mitnick "Art of Deception", Verizon DBIR 2025).
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- 신뢰도 A.
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## 🕓 Changelog
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| 날짜 | 변경 |
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|---|---|
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| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
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| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — SE attack vectors, Cialdini levers, FIDO2/DMARC defenses |
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