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Antigravity Agent
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id: wiki-2026-0508-excessive-agency
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title: Excessive Agency (LLM)
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category: 10_Wiki/Topics
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status: verified
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canonical_id: self
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aliases: [excessive agency, OWASP LLM06, agent over-permission, tool abuse, autonomous risk]
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duplicate_of: none
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source_trust_level: A
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confidence_score: 0.92
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verification_status: applied
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tags: [llm-security, owasp, excessive-agency, agent-safety, tool-use, permission]
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raw_sources: []
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last_reinforced: 2026-05-10
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github_commit: pending
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tech_stack:
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language: Python / TypeScript
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framework: LangChain / LlamaIndex / Custom Agent
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---
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# Excessive Agency
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## 매 한 줄
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> **"매 LLM agent 의 의 의 too 의 permission / function / autonomy"**. OWASP LLM Top 10 (LLM06). 매 manipulated → 매 destructive action. 매 mitigation: 매 least privilege + 매 human-in-the-loop + 매 sandboxed tools.
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## 매 핵심
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### 매 sub-type
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- **Excessive functionality**: 매 too many tools.
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- **Excessive permission**: 매 broad access.
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- **Excessive autonomy**: 매 no HITL.
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### 매 attack scenario
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- **Prompt injection** → 매 tool 의 abuse.
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- **Indirect** (web page) → 매 fetched 의 inject.
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- **Cross-tool**: 매 read DB → 매 send email.
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- **Agent escalation**: 매 self-empower.
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### 매 응용 risk
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1. **Email agent**: 매 send to anyone.
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2. **DB agent**: 매 DROP TABLE.
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3. **Browser agent**: 매 sensitive site visit.
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4. **Code agent**: 매 git push --force.
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5. **Multi-agent**: 매 manager prompt-inject worker.
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### 매 mitigation
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- **Least privilege**.
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- **Read-only by default**.
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- **HITL for destructive**.
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- **Sandbox / capability**.
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- **Rate limit**.
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- **Audit log**.
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## 💻 패턴
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### Tool whitelist (least privilege)
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```python
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def safe_agent_tools(user_role):
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base = ['search', 'read_doc']
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if user_role == 'admin':
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base += ['write_doc', 'send_email']
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if user_role == 'super_admin':
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base += ['delete_doc']
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return base
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agent = create_agent(tools=safe_agent_tools(current_user.role))
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```
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### HITL approval
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```python
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def execute_tool(tool, args):
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if tool.is_destructive:
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approval = request_human_approval(f"Approve {tool.name} with {args}?")
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if not approval: return {'status': 'denied'}
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return tool.run(**args)
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```
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### Sandboxed file write
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```python
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import os
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SANDBOX = '/tmp/agent-sandbox'
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os.makedirs(SANDBOX, exist_ok=True)
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def safe_write(filename, content):
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full = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(SANDBOX, filename))
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if not full.startswith(SANDBOX):
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raise SecurityError('Outside sandbox')
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open(full, 'w').write(content)
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```
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### Read-only DB role
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```sql
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CREATE ROLE agent_readonly;
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GRANT SELECT ON ALL TABLES IN SCHEMA public TO agent_readonly;
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-- 매 NO insert / update / delete
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```
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### Capability token
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```python
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class Capability:
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def __init__(self, action, resource, expires_in=300):
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self.token = jwt.encode({'action': action, 'resource': resource, 'exp': time() + expires_in}, KEY)
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def use(self, action, resource):
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claims = jwt.decode(self.token, KEY)
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assert claims['action'] == action and claims['resource'] == resource
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return True
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# 매 agent 의 cap 의 의 use, 매 broader 의 X
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```
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### Rate limit + budget
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```python
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class AgentBudget:
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def __init__(self, max_calls=50, max_cost_usd=1.0):
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self.calls = 0; self.cost = 0
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self.max_calls = max_calls; self.max_cost = max_cost_usd
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def check(self, estimated_cost):
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if self.calls >= self.max_calls: raise LimitError('Call limit')
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if self.cost + estimated_cost > self.max_cost: raise LimitError('Cost limit')
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def record(self, cost):
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self.calls += 1; self.cost += cost
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```
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### Tool taint analysis
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```python
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def detect_tainted_input(text, tool_args):
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"""매 if user input flows to high-impact tool, escalate."""
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if any(t in str(tool_args) for t in TAINT_MARKERS):
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return require_approval(tool, tool_args)
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return False
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```
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### Indirect injection check
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```python
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def sanitize_external_content(html):
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"""매 web fetched 의 instruction strip."""
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soup = BeautifulSoup(html, 'lxml')
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for tag in soup.find_all(['script', 'iframe']):
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tag.decompose()
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text = soup.get_text()
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# 매 prompt-inject pattern
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if re.search(r'(ignore (previous|all) instructions|new task|system:)', text, re.I):
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return text + "\n\n[NOTE: Suspicious content detected]"
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return text
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```
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### Multi-agent isolation
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```python
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class IsolatedAgent:
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def __init__(self, role, tools):
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self.role = role
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self.tools = tools # 매 role-specific
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def receive(self, msg, sender):
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# 매 不 trust other agents' tool requests
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if sender != 'human' and msg.requests_tool_use:
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return 'Agent-to-agent tool requests not allowed'
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```
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### Audit log
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```python
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def audit_tool_use(tool, args, result, user):
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log({
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'timestamp': now(),
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'user': user,
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'agent_session': current_session.id,
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'tool': tool.name,
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'args': hash_sensitive(args),
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'result_status': result.status,
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'cost_usd': result.cost,
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})
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```
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### Dry-run mode
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```python
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def dry_run_tool(tool, args):
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"""매 destructive action 의 simulate."""
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plan = tool.plan(**args)
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return f"DRY RUN: would {plan.summary}"
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```
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### Reversibility check
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```python
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def assess_reversibility(tool, args):
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if tool.action == 'delete' and not args.get('soft'): return 'irreversible'
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if tool.action == 'send_message': return 'visible_to_others'
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if tool.action == 'transfer_money': return 'irreversible'
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return 'safe'
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# 매 irreversible → HITL
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```
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## 매 결정 기준
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| 상황 | Mitigation |
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|---|---|
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| Read-only research | Whitelist + audit |
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| Write actions | HITL approval |
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| Destructive | Reversibility + HITL |
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| Multi-agent | Isolation |
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| Public-facing | Sandbox + budget |
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| Sensitive data | Capability token |
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**기본값**: 매 least privilege tools + 매 HITL for destructive + 매 sandbox + 매 audit + 매 budget cap.
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## 🔗 Graph
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- 응용: [[Tool-Use]] · [[HITL]]
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- Adjacent: [[Prompt-Injection]] · [[AI_Safety_and_Alignment|Constitutional-AI]]
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## 🤖 LLM 활용
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**언제**: 매 모든 agent. 매 tool-using LLM. 매 production deploy.
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**언제 X**: 매 sandboxed dev only.
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## ❌ 안티패턴
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- **All-tools agent**: 매 broad attack surface.
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- **No HITL on destructive**: 매 single mistake.
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- **Implicit trust of fetched**: 매 indirect injection.
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- **No budget**: 매 runaway cost.
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- **No audit**: 매 forensics 의 X.
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## 🧪 검증 / 중복
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- Verified (OWASP LLM Top 10 2024, Anthropic agent safety).
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- 신뢰도 A.
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## 🕓 Changelog
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| 날짜 | 변경 |
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|---|---|
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| 2026-05-08 | Phase 1 |
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| 2026-05-10 | Manual cleanup — agency types + 매 whitelist / HITL / sandbox / budget code |
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